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INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE & NETWORKS

Public DNS Resolvers Under Fire: Quad9’s Exit from France Highlights the Growing Threat to Internet Infrastructure

Last month, the Swiss non-profit foundation Quad9 made the difficult announcement that it will withdraw its free public DNS resolver from France. This decision followed months of arduous litigation and a French court ruling that imposed continuous daily financial penalties on the organization for failing to block domain names associated with alleged copyright infringement.

Quad9’s departure from the French market is both disheartening and entirely understandable to technology advocates and civil liberties experts alike. The court’s ruling placed the non-profit organization into an impossible bind: it was forced to choose between crippling litigation combined with escalating financial penalties, or fundamentally altering its core service architecture in a way that would severely undermine the privacy and security of its global user base. Left with no viable, good options, Quad9 chose the exit door instead, pulling a trusted infrastructure service out of the country.

The withdrawal of a foundational infrastructure service from France fundamentally harms the free and open Internet, serving as an alarming warning of the severe collateral damage that will inevitably result if rightsholders and policymakers continue demanding maximal blocking across every single layer of the Internet. This move does not merely deprive French Internet users of a trustworthy, high-performing tool; it creates an immediate and very real risk of unexpected disruptions to their daily lives and operations. Quad9’s public resolver is widely utilized by a diverse array of individuals and organizations across France, including vital government bodies, educational institutions, hospitals, and public utilities. Because of the privacy-centric design of the service, Quad9 possesses no mechanism to directly notify those individuals and institutions that their resolver will soon stop working. If these affected parties fail to proactively change their network configurations and switch to an alternative resolver before Quad9 completely removes its service, their Internet connectivity will fail abruptly with no explanation or warning message.

Quad9 is unfortunately not the first public DNS resolver forced to withdraw from a country following heavy-handed blocking orders, and industry observers note that it almost certainly will not be the last. Cisco previously withdrew its OpenDNS resolver from France, Portugal, and Belgium—albeit temporarily in some cases—under remarkably similar legal circumstances. Meanwhile, a Belgian court recently issued a sweeping judicial order that would impose substantial financial penalties if Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco do not begin actively blocking websites through their respective public resolvers by early January 2027—a practice that major infrastructure providers like Cloudflare have historically never engaged in.

Cloudflare has spent years actively advocating against legal orders of this kind, warning that rightsholders’ unrelenting and indiscriminate demands for blocking by public DNS resolvers will end up causing profound, lasting harm to the structural integrity of the Internet.

A Refresher on DNS, the Domain Name System

To understand why this escalating legal battle poses such a profound problem, it helps to examine how the Internet actually works under the hood. DNS resolvers represent a foundational, indispensable piece of the Internet’s underlying infrastructure. Often described as the Internet’s phone book or address book, the Domain Name System translates human-readable website names—such as cloudflare.com—into the numeric IP addresses that electronic devices require to locate and connect with one another. A DNS resolver acts as the intermediary service that looks up that specific address and transmits it back to the user’s device, much like a telephone operator finding a specific phone number inside a massive directory.

DNS resolvers can technically be operated by anyone, but they are most commonly run by Internet service providers, mobile network operators, corporate businesses, and universities. For the average web surfer sitting at home who has never given a second thought to network architecture, they are almost certainly utilizing their ISP’s default DNS resolver. Because every single user relies on a DNS resolver every time they attempt to visit a website, send an email, or load an application, the reliability and trustworthiness of that resolver are paramount.

Furthermore, because a DNS resolver possesses deep visibility into all browsing activity, the choice of which resolver to use carries profound privacy implications. In addition to the local resolvers provided by standard ISPs, a variety of prominent public DNS resolvers are available to the public. Cloudflare launched its own public DNS resolver, known as 1.1.1.1, back in April 2018 as a way to give back to the global Internet community. The stated goal was simple: to make a fast, reliable, privacy-first consumer DNS service available for free to everyone.

That mission was realized. Today, 1.1.1.1 stands among the fastest DNS resolvers in the entire world, including across Europe. Cloudflare’s resolver is designed not to collect any user data, and the company explicitly does not sell browsing metrics to advertisers. For Cloudflare, 1.1.1.1 remains a prime example of its core corporate mission to help build a better, more resilient Internet.

This service is one of many public resolvers accessible to anyone. Alongside 1.1.1.1 and Quad9’s 9.9.9.9, other well-known public resolvers include Google’s 8.8.8.8 and Cisco’s OpenDNS. However, the fact that these services are offered entirely free of charge to consumers does not mean they are simple or cheap to provide. Operating a well-run global public DNS resolver is an extraordinary engineering feat, specifically engineered to securely and privately resolve hundreds of billions—and sometimes trillions—of queries every single day across a globally distributed network spanning hundreds of server locations.

As Quad9 has pointed out, many alternative DNS resolvers exist on the web, including numerous essentially anonymous services whose operational practices, logging policies, and ownership remain entirely unknown or undocumented. Changing a DNS resolver on a device or router is relatively straightforward, and everyday users frequently do so for various reasons, ranging from performance enhancements and connection reliability to accessing specialized security and filtering features.

Why Public DNS Resolvers Should Not Be Required to Block

Rightsholders undoubtedly hold a legitimate, recognized interest in preventing online piracy and protecting their intellectual property. However, attempting to address online infringement by leaning on public DNS resolvers is fundamentally the wrong legal and technical approach.

Among its primary flaws, such domain blocking is inherently ineffective. Returning to the analogy of an operator finding a phone number in a directory, if a court wishes to shut down an illegal business, forcing the directory operator to cross the business’s name out of the phone book does not actually close the business down. The physical or digital storefront remains open, the products or files are still there, and anyone who already knows the direct address—or simply uses a different phone book—can easily walk right in.

The exact same reality applies to the broader Internet. DNS resolvers represent merely one minor link in a long transmission chain. The only technical mechanism available for a DNS resolver to "block" content is by declining to return the correct IP address when a user requests a particular domain name. A public DNS resolver cannot remove the actual infringing content from the Internet, nor can it take down the remote servers hosting those illicit files.

Because of this architectural limitation, blocking via public DNS resolvers is remarkably easy to bypass. Any Internet user who genuinely wants to reach a blocked site can circumvent the restriction in less than a minute simply by switching their device settings to one of the thousands of other public or private DNS resolvers available online. In fact, users do not even need a functional resolver at all to reach infringing content if they already know the underlying IP address. Unsurprisingly, while forced blocking via public resolvers may introduce minor friction for casual users attempting to access content, empirical evidence shows it does nothing to actually reduce the total volume of online infringement occurring across the globe.

In addition to being largely ineffective, DNS blocking operates as a blunt, indiscriminate instrument that causes significant collateral damage. Because the Domain Name System operates strictly at the domain level rather than the file level, a resolver cannot selectively block a specific infringing video, image, or document; it is forced to block the entire domain name. This sweeps up all content hosted on that domain, whether completely legal or illegal. Furthermore, the action is entirely opaque to the ordinary user: when a resolver is legally compelled to block a domain, the website simply fails to load. The user receives no explanatory text or legal notice, making it impossible to determine whether the site is simply down for routine maintenance, whether their local network connection is broken, or whether the site was cut off by a secretive court order.

This problem becomes substantially worse when applied specifically to public DNS resolvers. Because public resolvers operate on a global scale, any local blocking mandates will naturally cross international borders, meaning that a single country’s court could effectively dictate what content is accessible to citizens around the world. For instance, while the EU-dedicated DNS resolver DNS4EU, operated by Whalebone, blocks content in response to country-specific orders, it does so uniformly across the entire European Union. Any efforts to reengineer public DNS resolvers to accommodate fragmented, localized blocking rules would fundamentally alter the core nature of the service, harming network performance and resilience, undermining user privacy, and ultimately fragmenting the open, unified Internet.

For these critical reasons, major infrastructure providers including Cloudflare, Google, Cisco, and Quad9 have consistently opposed efforts to mandate blocking by public DNS resolvers, achieving some notable legal victories along the way. Several years ago, courts in Germany ruled firmly in favor of both Cloudflare and Quad9, explicitly rejecting legal requests that sought to require DNS-level blocking. More recently, a French court rejected financial penalties against Cloudflare for failing to block content through the 1.1.1.1 resolver, finding that alternative actions taken through Cloudflare’s content delivery network (CDN) and reverse-proxy services were sufficient to comply with the underlying court order.

Yet, undeterred by these setbacks, rightsholders have continued to press relentlessly for blocking mandates across public resolvers. A recent study found that the vast majority of online piracy targeted in Europe is actually hosted directly within European data centers. Experts argue that if rightsholders genuinely want to address online infringement at its root, they should focus their enforcement efforts where they will have a lasting impact—most notably by requiring the hosting providers who physically store the pirated files to take them down at the source.

Forcing Public DNS Resolvers Out of Markets Hurts the Internet

The French court’s severe penalty order against Quad9 represents the culmination of these aggressive rightsholder lobbying efforts. As a small non-profit organization that exclusively operates a public DNS resolver and maintains no CDN infrastructure in that specific capacity, Quad9 had no alternative compliance mechanisms available to demonstrate adherence to the order. The French court therefore granted rightsholders’ requests to issue escalating financial penalties for non-compliance, leaving Quad9 with the stark choice of compromising its architectural principles or abandoning the French market entirely.

Quad9’s withdrawal from France represents a genuine loss for the health of the Internet ecosystem. In the immediate short term, the removal of Quad9’s resolver risks causing immediate and potentially severe disruptions to local Internet access. Because of the strict privacy architecture of their service, Quad9 has no internal records identifying who is using its resolver, making it impossible to directly notify users about the impending service termination. Consequently, everyday individuals, hospitals, universities, and government offices may be caught entirely unaware when the infrastructure stops resolving. Because of how DNS failures manifest, those users will not receive a detailed error message explaining the political or legal context; their applications and web browsers will simply stop working. The situation becomes even more precarious when automated devices, such as local security systems or smart building thermostats, are hardwired to rely exclusively on Quad9’s IP addresses. For those systems, troubleshooting and fixing the sudden failure may prove slow, costly, or nearly impossible.

More broadly, driving trustworthy operators like Quad9 out of France does nothing to prevent online infringement, but it leaves everyday Internet users with fewer safe, reliable choices—particularly services that actively protect users from malicious phishing campaigns and malware distribution. Forcing established public DNS resolvers out of a market pushes ordinary users to fall back on default ISP resolvers that may monetize their browsing habits, or compels them to seek out lesser-known resolvers operated by anonymous, unaccountable entities, or even run their own unmanaged resolvers. The profound irony is that organizations like Quad9 and Cloudflare are repeatedly dragged into court precisely because they are transparent, highly reputable entities operating in the open. Penalizing transparent services only serves to push users toward the less accountable, shadier corners of the web.

The Way Forward

If nothing else, industry leaders hope that Quad9’s withdrawal serves as a wake-up call to rightsholders and policymakers, demonstrating that attempting to enforce copyright blocking at every layer of the Internet carries very real, tangible costs for infrastructure stability.

Advocates maintain that there are far better, more cooperative ways to fight online piracy without compromising the technical integrity of the global network. Cloudflare and other infrastructure providers continue to pursue innovative collaborations to address network abuse. Collective enforcement efforts regarding online infringement would be far more productively directed toward compelling hosting providers to remove infringing material at the source, which would achieve a durable, permanent solution while completely avoiding collateral damage to the broader Internet.

In the meantime, major public resolvers intend to keep resisting misguided legal efforts that attempt to force content blocking at the DNS level. Alongside Google and Cisco, Cloudflare has actively appealed a sweeping Belgian order that threatens substantial financial penalties if they do not initiate DNS blocking by January 2027. Industry stakeholders hope to achieve a clear legal resolution before the end of the year to prevent a recurrence of the situation Quad9 now faces in France.

Infrastructure providers express grave concern over the widespread disruption that will inevitably follow if additional public resolvers are forced to withdraw from regional markets under legal duress, and they vow to continue advocating against that damaging outcome as legal battles continue across Europe.