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CYBERSECURITY & DATA PRIVACY

Google and Industry Partners Dismantle Massive "XCPE" Botnet Infecting 1.3 Million Android TV Boxes

Google announced today that it has successfully worked alongside a coalition of industry partners to dismantle a sprawling botnet consisting of more than 1.3 million Android TV set-top boxes. These devices are shipped directly from manufacturers pre-installed with malicious software designed to secretly rent out users’ internet connections to anonymous third parties while simultaneously conducting widespread advertising fraud. Security experts involved in the collaborative takedown warn that this coordinated action is likely to sever the botnet’s access to more than 10 million additional compromised systems globally. These supplementary systems include a variety of other Internet of Things (IoT) products, such as Android-based healthcare equipment, karaoke machines, and digital signage.

A comprehensive report published by the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) revealed that Google has officially severed its business ties with Videostrong Technology Co., a prominent TV box manufacturer based in China. According to conclusions reached by GTIG and other independent cybersecurity experts, Videostrong was directly responsible for baking the malicious software into the firmware, which automatically enrolled more than 1.3 million set-top boxes into a sophisticated botnet dubbed "XCPE," a name derived from one of the malware’s core code components.

The Mechanics of the XCPE Botnet and Residential Proxies

The GTIG report details how the XCPE botnet loads infected hardware with specialized software that transforms a user’s home internet connection into a monetizable asset. By making the victim’s IP address available for resale by multiple "residential proxy" services, the malware allows paying customers to route their web traffic through residential networks. This practice is frequently used to anonymize malicious web traffic, evade geo-blocking restrictions, or spoof true geographic locations.

As documented extensively over the past year across various cybersecurity investigations, residential proxy services have rapidly evolved into a major vector for unwanted and malicious internet traffic. This traffic is frequently tied to malicious activities such as account takeover attacks, sophisticated advertising fraud, and mass content scraping operations executed to feed resource-hungry artificial intelligence projects.

"Videostrong monetized the backdoor by selling access to criminal affiliates and loading those affiliates’ malware modules onto infected devices," the GTIG blog post explains. To combat the threat, Google initiated legal actions to seize control of the specific domains and infrastructure servers that Videostrong relied upon to command the botnet and push additional malicious payloads. "A device manufacturer intentionally infecting their users with malware is an unacceptable breach of trust, and represents a serious risk to those users. Without users’ knowledge or consent, infected devices were offered as a distribution mechanism for a wide array of criminal actors."

Although standard Android TV streaming boxes made up the vast majority of the dismantled botnet, the underlying XCPE malware was also detected embedded within a diverse range of other Android-based IoT products. These included specialized telehealth devices, commercial karaoke machines, and digital displays. Google maintains strict compliance requirements for Android device manufacturers, mandating that they pass rigorous compatibility and security evaluations to ensure their hardware does not jeopardize consumer safety. Nevertheless, investigators found that Videostrong managed to circumvent these safeguards by engineering the malicious software to execute immediately upon a user’s initial boot-up of the device—a weakness Google states it has since addressed.

Tech Firms Dismantle Botnet That Turned 1.3M TV Boxes Into Proxies – Krebs on Security

Connections to Major Proxy Networks and Ecosystem Players

The GTIG report highlights several commercial residential proxy providers whose software development kits (SDKs) were routinely discovered on devices ensnared by the XCPE botnet. Among these entities is AppSalt, also widely known as Honeygain, which was originally developed by Oxylabs, a company based in Vilnius, Lithuania. In October 2026, Oxylabs and Honeygain completed a corporate restructuring, establishing themselves as independent platforms operating under a newly formed umbrella entity named Source. This restructuring followed a significant $130 million funding injection from private equity firm Warburg Pincus, a transaction that reportedly valued the enterprise at approximately $3.6 billion.

Another prominent proxy provider linked directly to the botnet is NetNut, a sprawling residential proxy enterprise operated by Alarum Technologies, a publicly traded company based in Israel. In July 2026, federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, collaborated with industry security partners to seize hundreds of domains associated with NetNut. Authorities stated at the time that the company was responsible for operating a separate, parallel botnet named Popa, which similarly enslaved standard TV set-top boxes to function as residential proxy exit nodes. Additional proxy vendors identified in the GTIG report include EarnFM, Traffmonetizer, Jaguar, LINKFOG, BMW/IPWeb, and GaGaNode.

Google’s public disclosure credits a broad alliance of industry partners for their contributions to the investigation, including Synthient, a specialized security startup that tracks commercial proxy infrastructure. In January 2026, Synthient published pioneering research detailing the rapid, global expansion of the Kimwolf botnet. At the time, Kimwolf was actively inundating enterprise and consumer networks worldwide with record-breaking distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Synthient’s investigation mapped out how Kimwolf managed to infect millions of Android set-top boxes almost overnight by exploiting widespread vulnerabilities within residential proxy services, subsequently pivoting from those devices to compromise other Android hardware residing on the same local networks.

The publication of Synthient’s findings prompted numerous residential proxy providers to patch vulnerabilities across their respective networks. This defensive response effectively fractured the Kimwolf botnet into isolated fragments, significantly reducing the scale and disruptiveness of its continuous DDoS campaigns and making them far easier for network operators to mitigate. The research also caught the attention of the Motion Picture Association (MPA), the prominent trade association representing major Hollywood studios. The MPA partnered with Synthient to acquire and conduct forensic teardowns on a variety of popular Android TV set-top boxes, including several models already compromised by Kimwolf and related IoT botnets.

In a companion report published simultaneously with Google’s announcement, Synthient examined a popular, pre-infected TV box sold under the brand name MECOOL by Skyworth Technology, a publicly traded Chinese corporation. Synthient concluded that MECOOL also bundled malware supplied by Videostrong Technology Co., which similarly deployed AppSalt/Honeygain and other proxy components without authorization. Synthient founder Ben Brundage noted in interviews that Videostrong’s backdoor distribution network also disseminated software for another proxy service called Grass. Previous independent research published by Censys in November 2025 similarly discovered that the popular Superbox streaming device bundled Grass residential proxy software, though representatives for Grass consistently denied any institutional affiliation with the hardware manufacturer.

Marketing Channels and Downstream Impact

Both Superbox and MECOOL achieved widespread consumer adoption through aggressive digital marketing campaigns, frequently leveraging social media influencers on platforms like TikTok and YouTube to promote the hardware’s capability to stream hundreds of pay-TV channels and live sports for a single, low up-front fee—streams that are frequently pirated. Synthient’s research specifically pointed to the popular YouTube channel Linus Tech Tips, which boasts an audience of nearly 17 million subscribers, for featuring MECOOL streaming boxes in past content. Following notification by researchers, Linus Tech Tips updated the affected video to explicitly characterize the hardware as a scam and removed all associated affiliate links.

Tech Firms Dismantle Botnet That Turned 1.3M TV Boxes Into Proxies – Krebs on Security

While the primary botnet takedown accounts for 1.3 million active connections, security analysts emphasize that the true scope of the infection is significantly broader. GTIG noted that the various proxy and ad-fraud affiliates tied to Videostrong maintained diversified distribution channels extending well beyond the core XCPE framework. Synthient founder Ben Brundage underscored this assessment, describing the official 1.3 million figure as highly conservative.

"The scale of affected devices is likely way higher," Brundage remarked, characterizing the operation as the largest coordinated strike against backdoored streaming hardware documented to date.

In a statement issued following the initial publication of these findings, Oxylabs clarified that its infrastructure is technically engineered to prevent a device from functioning as a proxy exit node unless the network receives explicit verification that the end-user has provided consent. However, the company acknowledged that malicious developers successfully devised methods to spoof these verification signals.

"We have been conducting regular audits of the applications provided by our partners," the Oxylabs statement read. "However, following this incident, we will improve the application and application’s build fingerprinting logic to better detect cases where the SDK is running on an unapproved build of an originally authorized application."

Oxylabs added that while it has no direct corporate records concerning Videostrong Technology Co., its compliance teams did identify a suspicious supplier domain referenced in the GTIG report as an external malware loader. "As soon as we saw that, we suspended the relationship and sent them a formal legal inquiry. This supplier accounts for less than 1% of our IP address pool. We had a signed contract with them, they assured our QA team that users had given consent, and we saw the consent flow ourselves."