Several staffers at the White House have been using computers and mobile devices equipped with residential proxy services that inadvertently render their secure internet addresses available for anyone to rent, according to cybersecurity experts. The alarming discovery reveals that a dedicated government network used by the Executive Office of the President has been actively leaking traffic through commercial proxy nodes, with at least one prominent service tied to a Russian founder whose previous web hosting infrastructure served as ground zero for cyberattacks against state election systems.
Security intelligence firm Layer3 Intel announced today that it detected multiple residential proxy nodes beaconing out directly from the internet address network reserved for the Executive Office of the President, designated as AS2650. According to Layer3, the unauthorized proxy activity was relatively persistent over a one-month observation window between October 5 and November 3. A rigorous review of the proxies available from the AS2650 block showed that they successfully exited from the White House network a staggering 236 times during that specific period.
The proxy tracking and threat intelligence company Synthient confirmed the findings on social media, noting that the outbound activity observed originating from the White House network was directly related to multiple Windows 11 installations running a service called Infatica. Infatica is a commercial proxy program that is frequently bundled into, or hidden within, seemingly innocuous "free" mobile and desktop applications. The corporate background of Infatica deepens the security implications: the company was founded by Vladimir Fomenko, a Russian national whose previous web hosting firm, King Servers, was identified by investigators as home to six of the eight specific internet addresses utilized by Russian state security services to compromise sensitive databases for election systems in Arizona and Illinois back in 2016.
The implications of residential proxy networks extend far beyond a single vendor. There are currently dozens of commercial residential proxy providers operating globally with varying degrees of legitimacy, a significant portion of which are based in jurisdictions such as China and Russia. At their core, all of these services operate on a simple premise: they make it remarkably easy for paying customers to rent out the residential or corporate internet addresses of unsuspecting third parties. This allows proxy customers to effectively anonymize their web traffic or spoof their true geographic location. From the perspective of any target website, incoming traffic from a proxy network user appears to originate entirely from the rented IP address rather than the actual device or location of the proxy service customer.
Layer3 Intel reported that the proxy exit nodes operating out of the White House network emanated from six distinct internet addresses, appearing active on 26 out of 30 days during the monitoring period. Furthermore, analysts noted a distinct temporal pattern, with the vast majority of the unauthorized proxy activity occurring during evening hours, specifically between 5:00 p.m. and midnight, when normal office operational routines typically wind down.
Incredibly, Infatica was not even the sole proxy service found to be reselling access to high-value White House internet addresses. Layer3 Intel stated that its investigation uncovered an even wider security gap, finding that 28 separate residential proxy services were capable of routing traffic and exiting directly through this sensitive government network.
Describing the ease with which outside entities could leverage the network, the Layer3 Intel research team detailed their findings in a public advisory. They explained that the infrastructure effectively functions as public access. According to the researchers, anyone can obtain access simply by signing up for a public residential proxy service, paying a nominal fee of a few dollars, and routing web requests through it. The researchers emphasized that they did not selectively target the White House network or attempt to force their probes to exit from it; rather, they encountered the vulnerability entirely by chance simply by requesting global rotating access through these commercial services.
The White House did not immediately respond to requests for comment regarding the security findings.
The discovery highlights an escalating digital threat vector that security researchers have tracked closely over the past year. Residential proxy services have increasingly become a primary source of unwanted and frequently malicious internet traffic. This traffic is regularly leveraged by threat actors to execute account takeovers, perpetrate various forms of cybercrime, conduct advertising fraud, and execute mass content scraping operations to feed data-hungry artificial intelligence projects.
Beyond fraud and data scraping, these proxy arrangements introduce profound architectural security risks to any environment where they are deployed. In late 2025, security researchers discovered that cybercriminals were actively mass-exploiting widespread vulnerabilities inherent in many residential proxy platforms. This flaw allowed attackers to systematically probe each proxy endpoint’s local network, searching for vulnerable systems and internal devices to infect with malware. The situation escalated to emergency remediation in January 2026, when dozens of commercial proxy services were forced to rapidly patch their networks after Synthient Founder Ben Brundage publicly demonstrated how malicious actors were abusing vulnerabilities in residential proxy architectures to seize administrative control over devices sitting quietly inside the local networks of unsuspecting users.
The accessibility and low cost of these services exacerbate the danger to high-profile networks. Some of these commercial resellers sell bandwidth for prices as low as sixty cents per gigabyte. That means for less than a single dollar, an adversary can gain direct, authorized-looking access into some of the most confidential and trusted networks in the world. The broader commercial reseller ecosystem further compounds the risk by allowing malicious actors to purchase access while entirely bypassing standard Know Your Customer, or KYC, identity verification processes.
In most cases, these risky proxy services find their way onto protected corporate and government networks through employee devices brought into the workplace. Software and application developers frequently embed software development kits, or SDKs, provided by residential proxy networks into consumer applications as a monetization strategy. This practice enables developers to generate a small stream of revenue for every installation, turning ordinary user devices into unwitting commercial proxy exit nodes.
Despite the obvious dangers, residential proxies remain shockingly prevalent across sensitive government and corporate infrastructure. In a technical webinar held in January 2026, proxy tracking firm Spur revealed that it had detected active residential proxies operating within nearly 300 government-owned and operated networks. The same tracking data found similar infections across 318 utility companies, 166 healthcare organizations and hospitals, and 141 firms operating within the banking and financial sectors. Additionally, a threat intelligence report published earlier this year by security firm Infoblox indicated that fully 65 percent of its enterprise customer base had corporate systems querying one or more residential proxy-related domains.