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CYBERSECURITY & DATA PRIVACY

U.S. Army Soldier Sentenced to Nearly Six Years in Federal Prison for Massive AT&T and Telecom Extortion Scheme

A U.S. Army soldier who pleaded guilty to hacking into multiple telecommunications companies and stealing mobile call and text metadata belonging to more than 100 million AT&T customers was sentenced in a federal court to 70 months in prison and ordered to pay nearly $300,000 in restitution to victims.

Cameron John Wagenius, a 22-year-old active-duty service member stationed at a U.S. Army base in South Korea, orchestrated the cyberattacks under the online persona “Kiberphant0m.” Operating alongside a network of alleged co-conspirators, Wagenius exploited vulnerable cloud data storage accounts hosted by Snowflake. These targeted corporate accounts had suffered from exposed credentials and failed to enforce multi-factor authentication, a security oversight that Snowflake has since addressed by mandating multi-factor authentication across all accounts.

The operation came to light in October 2024, when Wagenius took to cybercrime forums to openly brag about his exploits. He claimed responsibility for stealing call and text metadata—including source and destination numbers, timestamps, and call durations—for tens of millions of AT&T customers. Furthermore, Kiberphant0m asserted that he had successfully breached more than a dozen telecommunications companies worldwide, including Verizon’s Push-to-Talk business, subsequently launching public extortion campaigns against these corporations with threats to leak the stolen proprietary and sensitive customer data unless his demands were met.

Investigators began closing in on the cybercriminal persona late last year. In late November 2024, cybersecurity reporting indicated that Kiberphant0m was likely a U.S. soldier stationed in South Korea. Less than a month after those investigative warnings were published, Wagenius was taken into custody, subsequently facing two separate federal indictments before pleading guilty to all counts across both cases.

During his sentencing hearing in Seattle, federal judges formally handed down the nearly six-year federal prison sentence, alongside an order to pay $294,978 in victim restitution. Federal prosecutors outlined that Wagenius did not operate in a vacuum, receiving assistance in his extortion plots from Kenneth Schuchman, a 28-year-old resident of Vancouver, Washington, with an extensive cybercriminal background. Schuchman previously pleaded guilty in 2019 to operating the Satori botnet, a vast and dangerous collection of compromised Internet-of-Things devices utilized for large-scale distributed denial-of-service attacks.

Wagenius’s other alleged co-conspirators are also facing legal repercussions regarding the Snowflake data thefts. Conor Riley Moucka, an individual from Kitchener, Ontario, known online as “Judische,” was arrested in 2024 and entered a guilty plea. Another alleged participant, John Erin Binns, an American citizen currently residing in Turkey, remains wanted by authorities for his alleged connection to a massive 2021 data breach at T-Mobile that exposed the personal identifying information of at least 76 million customers.

The scope of the extortion schemes expanded into sensitive geopolitical and security arenas as Kiberphant0m resorted to re-extorting corporate victims and threatening the disclosure of national security secrets. Following Moucka’s arrest—and after AT&T had already paid the extortion syndicate a ransom of approximately $370,000 in Bitcoin—Kiberphant0m published files on hacker forums that he claimed were call logs belonging to then President-elect Donald Trump and then Vice President Kamala Harris, alongside technical schematics allegedly stolen from the U.S. National Security Agency.

Paul Russell, a resident agent in charge at the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the criminal investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, detailed the high-priority response triggered by the case. Once DCIS received intelligence suggesting an active-duty soldier holding a secret security clearance was neck-deep in international cybercrime and extortion, a multi-agency task force was formed involving the FBI, the Army Criminal Investigative Division, and the U.S. Secret Service.

According to Russell, discovering an insider threat of this magnitude was an extraordinary and alarming development. Law enforcement partners recognized the gravity of the situation immediately, treating it as an unprecedented security puzzle because an active-duty soldier with a secret clearance was actively manufacturing hacking tools and trafficking in stolen data.

Despite cooperating quickly after his arrest and entering prompt guilty pleas, Wagenius’s troubles with institutional rules did not end upon his detention. A sentencing memo filed by federal prosecutors in Seattle revealed that while incarcerated and awaiting sentencing, Wagenius attempted to probe the computer network vulnerabilities of the Bureau of Prisons. Government attorneys noted that Wagenius bypassed standard computer use policies by leveraging another inmate’s email system to query commercial artificial intelligence tools about specific software vulnerabilities, privilege escalation pathways for Windows operating systems, and functional exploit scripts.

In subsequent communications, Wagenius utilized other inmate email accounts to solicit step-by-step instructions and technical code for command injection vulnerabilities affecting D-Link networking devices, alongside queries on how to construct improvised radio antennas from prison commissary items to extend reception. Prosecutors also noted that Wagenius queried the system regarding prison escape tactics. To bypass safety filters built into commercial artificial intelligence applications—which are designed to prevent the generation of malicious exploit code—Wagenius frequently framed his queries within the context of researching a book he claimed to be writing, a classic example of prompt injection techniques utilized by sophisticated threat actors.

While federal prosecutors confirmed they found no evidence that Wagenius successfully deployed or executed these researched vulnerabilities within the Bureau of Prisons systems, his actions demonstrated a persistent technical curiosity. When confronted, Wagenius maintained that he was merely researching potential vulnerabilities to report them to prison authorities.

Despite the monumental scale of data exfiltrated from telecommunications giants like AT&T, the financial returns of the operation were remarkably low. Court filings indicate that despite the massive volume of stolen information, Wagenius netted a total of approximately $1,500 from selling the pilfered data.

As prosecutors emphasized in their sentencing memorandum, while Wagenius may not have achieved financial success as a cybercriminal, his deliberate actions inflicted significant and widespread harm upon individual citizens, prominent U.S. corporations, and national security interests.