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CYBERSECURITY & DATA PRIVACY

Google and Industry Partners Dismantle Massive "XCPE" Android TV Botnet Compromising Over 1.3 Million Devices

Google announced today that it has successfully worked alongside a coalition of industry partners to dismantle a massive, highly sophisticated botnet comprising more than 1.3 million Android TV set-top boxes. These devices were shipped directly to consumers pre-installed with malicious software designed to secretly rent out users’ home internet connections to anonymous third parties while simultaneously conducting widespread advertising fraud. Cybersecurity experts involved in the complex, multi-agency takedown estimate that this coordinated enforcement action will likely sever the botnet’s access to more than 10 million additional compromised systems globally, including various other Internet of Things (IoT) products such as Android-based healthcare devices, karaoke machines, and digital signage systems.

According to a detailed technical report published by the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), Google has officially severed all business and operational ties with Videostrong Technology Co., a prominent TV box manufacturer based in China. GTIG and independent industry security researchers concluded that Videostrong was directly responsible for embedding the malicious code that enrolled more than 1.3 million set-top boxes into a sprawling botnet designated as "XCPE," named after one of the malware’s core operating components.

The investigation revealed that the XCPE botnet systematically loaded unsuspecting users’ devices with unauthorized software designed to make their home internet IP addresses available for resale by multiple commercial "residential proxy" services. These proxy services allow paying customers to rent residential internet addresses as a mechanism to anonymize their web traffic, bypass geographical restrictions, or spoof their true physical locations. As documented extensively across numerous cybersecurity reports over the past several years, residential proxy services have increasingly become a primary infrastructure source for unwanted, disruptive, and frequently malicious online traffic. This includes account takeover campaigns, large-scale advertising fraud, and aggressive mass content scraping operations executed to feed resource-hungry artificial intelligence projects.

"Videostrong monetized the backdoor by selling access to criminal affiliates and loading those affiliates’ malware modules onto infected devices," the GTIG report states, highlighting that Google took decisive legal action to shut down the various domains and server infrastructure Videostrong utilized to command and control the botnet and push additional payloads. "A device manufacturer intentionally infecting their users with malware is an unacceptable breach of trust, and represents a serious risk to those users. Without users’ knowledge or consent, infected devices were offered as a distribution mechanism for a wide array of criminal actors."

While standard home entertainment TV set-top boxes made up the vast majority of the compromised infrastructure, the GTIG report underscores that identical XCPE malware strains were discovered embedded within a wide variety of other Android-based IoT products. These included telehealth and remote monitoring devices, commercial karaoke machines, and digital display systems deployed in public and private spaces.

Tech Firms Dismantle Botnet That Turned 1.3M TV Boxes Into Proxies – Krebs on Security

Google maintains stringent security requirements, mandating that all Android device manufacturers pass rigorous compatibility and security evaluations to ensure their hardware and software ecosystems do not endanger end users. Nevertheless, investigators found that Videostrong managed to circumvent these safeguards, engineering its firmware to load and execute malicious software immediately after a consumer booted up one of these compromised devices for the very first time. Google confirmed that it has since addressed and closed the specific platform weakness that allowed this unauthorized installation to occur.

The GTIG report explicitly calls out a number of commercial residential proxy providers whose software development kits (SDKs) and monetization libraries were routinely downloaded and executed by devices enslaved by the XCPE botnet. Among those named is AppSalt, also widely known as Honeygain, which is owned by Oxylabs, a prominent proxy firm based in Vilnius, Lithuania. Oxylabs was reportedly relaunched under a new corporate brand called Source following a substantial $130 million funding injection from private equity firm Warburg Pincus, a transaction that reportedly valued the enterprise at approximately $3.6 billion. Representatives for Oxylabs did not respond to media requests for comment regarding their inclusion in the threat intelligence findings.

Another prominent proxy provider linked directly to the botnet’s operations is NetNut, a sprawling residential proxy network previously operated by Alarum Technologies, a publicly traded company based in Israel. In July 2026, the Federal Bureau of Investigation collaborated with industry cybersecurity partners to seize hundreds of internet domains associated with NetNut. At the time, law enforcement and security researchers stated that the company was responsible for orchestrating a separate, parallel botnet known as Popa, which similarly enslaved residential TV streaming boxes to function as unauthorized residential proxies. Additional proxy providers highlighted in the comprehensive GTIG report include EarnFM, Traffmonetizer, Jaguar, LINKFOG, BMW/IPWeb, and GaGaNode.

Google’s public announcement of the takedown acknowledges the vital contributions of numerous industry partners, including Synthient, a specialized security startup that actively tracks and analyzes commercial proxy infrastructure. In January 2026, Synthient published groundbreaking research detailing the rapid, global expansion of the Kimwolf botnet, which at the time was hammering enterprise networks and internet service providers worldwide with record-breaking distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Synthient’s investigation meticulously documented how Kimwolf infected millions of Android set-top boxes virtually overnight, exploiting widespread security vulnerabilities within residential proxy services to compromise additional Android-based devices located securely behind firewalls on the local networks of unsuspecting consumers.

The publication of Synthient’s research prompted dozens of residential proxy providers to hurriedly patch vulnerabilities in their networks. This defensive pressure successfully fragmented the Kimwolf botnet into much smaller, isolated clusters, rendering its relentless and disruptive DDoS attacks significantly easier for network operators and defenders to manage and mitigate. The research also drew the focused attention of the Motion Picture Association, a major trade organization representing Hollywood film studios, which partnered with Synthient to purchase, reverse-engineer, and dismantle a wide variety of popular Android TV set-top boxes—including units heavily infected by Kimwolf and other pervasive IoT botnets.

In a comprehensive technical report published alongside Google’s announcement, Synthient examined a popular, pre-infected streaming box sold under the brand name MECOOL by Skyworth Technology, a publicly traded company headquartered in China. Synthient concluded that MECOOL similarly bundled malware originating from Videostrong Technology Co., which in turn facilitated the silent installation of AppSalt/Honeygain and various other proxy network components without user awareness.

Tech Firms Dismantle Botnet That Turned 1.3M TV Boxes Into Proxies – Krebs on Security

Synthient founder Ben Brundage noted during discussions regarding the research that Videostrong’s malware infrastructure also actively distributed software components for another proxy service known as Grass. Previous industry reporting from security firm Censys revealed that popular Superbox TV streaming devices similarly bundled Grass’s residential proxy software out of the box, though representatives for Grass have consistently denied any formal affiliation or commercial relationship with the TV streaming hardware manufacturer.

Both Superbox and similar pre-infected Android set-top boxes have historically driven consumer acquisition primarily through aggressive marketing campaigns involving social media influencers on platforms like TikTok. These influencers frequently praise the hardware’s capability to stream hundreds of pay-TV channels and premium sports broadcasts for a single, low upfront fee, masking the reality that many of these services rely on unauthorized content distribution networks.

Similarly, Synthient’s report observes that MECOOL set-top boxes experienced an explosion in consumer popularity after being featured in a 2023 video by the prominent YouTube channel Linus Tech Tips, which boasts an audience of nearly 17 million subscribers. In a statement shared with Synthient, representatives for Linus Tech Tips confirmed that they have since updated the original video to explicitly categorize the hardware as a scam and have permanently removed all associated affiliate marketing links.

The GTIG threat intelligence report estimates that the successful disruption and takedown of the XCPE botnet will sever ongoing access to at least 10 million additional secondary compromised systems. The report points out that Videostrong’s diverse network of proxy and advertising fraud affiliates each maintain independent, diversified distribution channels for their respective software modules that extend well beyond the primary XCPE framework.

Brundage echoed this cautious assessment, characterizing the headline figure of 1.3 million direct infections as "highly conservative."

"The scale of affected devices is likely way higher," Brundage said, emphasizing the unprecedented nature of the enforcement operation. "This is probably the largest operation against backdoored TV boxes that we’ve seen."