A team of cryptographic researchers has released a comprehensive, 131-page security analysis evaluating SHRINCS, a proposed post-quantum signature scheme designed for Bitcoin. The authors have opened the work to the wider cryptographic and development community, actively inviting independent scrutiny, peer review, and searches for potential flaws.
Mikhail Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography researcher at Blockstream, announced the release of the analysis’s first version in a detailed thread on X
. According to Kudinov, the extensive paper successfully reduces the security profile of SHRINCS directly to the underlying properties of its designated hash function, marking a significant milestone in evaluating its viability for decentralized networks.
Dated November 18, the security evaluation estimates the classical security of SHRINCS to be between 121.4 and 122.7 bits. However, the researchers emphasize that these figures currently rely on several assumptions, including three unproven mathematical conjectures. Kudinov noted that the research is still an ongoing effort. The team is actively working to finalize a new, rigorous analysis regarding a specific property known as SM-DSPR, for which the security bound has thus far been established only through conjecture. Additionally, the researchers are focused on tightening a crucial reprogramming step within the proof and improving overall security bounds against sophisticated quantum adversaries.
How SHRINCS Works
Unlike contemporary Bitcoin transactions that rely on elliptic curve cryptography—specifically ECDSA and Schnorr signatures—SHRINCS is constructed as a hash-based signature scheme. This foundational architectural shift means that its long-term security rests entirely on the mathematical properties of hash functions rather than the algebraic curves that could potentially be undermined by future quantum computers running Shor’s algorithm.
The proposed scheme ingeniously integrates two distinct designs under a single cryptographic key structure. It combines a stateful path built upon FXMSS alongside WOTS+C with a stateless fallback mechanism engineered using SLH-DSA. Because both distinct pathways ultimately rely on the same underlying hash function, Kudinov explained that the comprehensive security proof must meticulously cover both systems simultaneously to ensure end-to-end reliability.
Despite its robust theoretical defense against quantum threats, signature size remains the primary economic and technical cost of the proposal. Under the current draft specifications, stateful SHRINCS signatures range dynamically from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless fallback path demands an even larger footprint of 5,777 bytes. By comparison, modern Schnorr signatures utilized in Bitcoin typically occupy just 64 bytes, and standard ECDSA signatures hover around 71 bytes. Because block space within the Bitcoin network is strictly limited and highly valued, drastically larger signatures inherently translate to fewer transactions fitting into a single block, posing distinct challenges for network throughput and fee markets.
The Risk of a Stateful Signature
While the stateful path of SHRINCS offers a more compact signature size compared to its stateless counterpart, it introduces a critical operational hazard unique to stateful cryptographic systems. The mechanism relies fundamentally on one-time keys. If a user’s wallet software inadvertently reuses a key state due to a software bug, system crash, or improper backup restoration, an attacker can easily forge a valid signature for that specific address and drain all associated funds. Consequently, wallet software implementing stateful schemes must rigorously and infallibly track the precise state and usage history of every single key.
The stateless path entirely avoids this catastrophic risk of key reuse, but it does so at the expense of a significantly larger signature size, which puts heavier resource demands on the blockchain.
Addressing these architectural dilemmas, Jonas Nick, Blockstream’s director of research, discussed the broader network implications during an appearance on MARA Foundation TV with Isabel Foxen Duke, head of the MARA Foundation. Nick emphasized that modern wallet infrastructure must be engineered to automatically and seamlessly fall back to the stateless path whenever there is even a remote possibility that a state counter could become compromised.
"It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens," Nick stated during the interview. "Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly."
Nick also cautioned that heavy reliance on substantially larger post-quantum signatures would exert profound pressure on the network’s transaction fee market and overall capacity. "We don’t know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures," he noted. "And it’s not just the fee market, it’s also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin. And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin."
Researchers Ask for Review
The authors of the 131-page analysis are transparent about the preliminary nature of their work and are actively urging the broader scientific and engineering communities to examine the proofs. Kudinov acknowledged that the document has not yet undergone formal, rigorous peer review. Furthermore, the project’s official public repository on GitHub explicitly warns that the documents may still contain errors and should not serve as the sole foundational basis for deploying SHRINCS in a live production environment.
"We tried to be careful, but a proof of this size can have mistakes," Kudinov wrote on X, encouraging interested developers and cryptographers to open issues on the repository if they identify any logical gaps or miscalculations.
Beyond the core SHRINCS evaluation, the research team produced two notable cryptographic findings that have broader applications beyond this specific proposal. These include establishing a classical bound for a property known as ITSR without the need for reprogramming, as well as defining a quadratic quantum bound for undetectability. Kudinov noted that these independent results also apply directly to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA—the established hash-based signature schemes that SHRINCS borrows from—and have been published as separate, dedicated papers to benefit the wider cryptographic research community.
This release arrives at a time when the urgency surrounding post-quantum cryptography is steadily rising across traditional financial systems and decentralized networks alike. Just this week, a prominent global group of securities regulators issued a warning emphasizing that migrating blockchain networks and financial ledgers to quantum-resistant cryptographic standards will present immense technical hurdles. Meanwhile, researchers recently designed a post-quantum defense mechanism specifically tailored for the Lightning Network, following the demonstration of Bitcoin’s first quantum-safe transaction executed without requiring a hard fork.
The draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) detailing SHRINCS is currently open to public comment, inviting scrutiny from all technical corners of the ecosystem.
"We need all the possible feedback — engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers," Kudinov said regarding the open call for review. "There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise."